wordpress moves to scrub moralphobia as wiki*edia, itself a neologism, has already
wiki*dia delete “dissussion” [pdf]
some blogs tagged with- or categorized on wordpress with “moralphobia” or “moralphobe” or “moralphobic” … do NOT appear in wordpress search (URLs). Some blogs featuring those words no longer appear in ANY tag-URLs or ANY category-URLs.
hmmmm.. can you smell the moralphobic agenda, too?
iphone voicemail sucks so what are you going to do? nothing. you can’t
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Jesse Ruderman, firefox whiz, overt fan of the needless www host, waxes on the subject not realizing the HTC phone series is a few clicks away
http://squarefree.com/2009/07/29/iphone-voicemail/
complains that when he misses a call and gets voicemail as a result, the iPhone forces him to click both Recents and Voicemail to clear badges.
So what are you going to do about it? Nothing likely you have an iphone. But if you were a developer and hacker like Jesse?
How could Apple address Cronin’s complaint
apparently nothing. No one can do anything about iphone voicemail sucking. You iphone itards will have to live in an obamaesque state of hope (lessness).
So go have an obama beer and enjoy the shiny suffering.
HTC phones on the otherhand put USERS in charge.
gmail goes back to closed invitation
there is no way I am giving my mobile number to google.. no way. I use gmail for disposable email and 419′ing.
http://mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?answer=114129#nophone
means I’ll be abandoning gmail completely in favor of yahoo.
placebo effective at treating vast majority of depression patients
why do so many insist on refering to this quackery as science or even medicine?
DTCP moxy.. master matrix sifting
http://mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg03834.html
Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2005 01:25:17 +0200 (CEST) DTV Content Protection Two content protection systems are in use to protect digital television (DTV) signals on the wires of American home video systems: HDCP and DTCP. HDCP is used for the most common digital cable connection to HD monitors, HDMI, which is a variant of DVI. DTCP is used for digital connections to video equipment, especially digital VCRs. It was originally designed for Firewire (aka iLink, aka IEEE-1394) but has been extended to USB-2 and Bluetooth, with IP in the works. Apparently monitors with both HDMI and Firewire connections would have to implement both. HDCP is described at digital-cp.com and DTCP at dtcp.com The full DTCP spec is still secret unless you are a licensee [[OhNoes... money outlay? where ever would a nefarious type acquire that??]] and the site has only limited information. The two systems are very different cryptographically. HDCP uses a 56-bit keyed stream cipher based on LFSRs. DTCP uses block ciphers, either a 56-bit key proprietary block cipher from Hitachi called M6, or AES with 128-bit keys. M6 is the default that all devices must implement. M6 uses an odd chaining mode called "converted CBC" which seems to chain the ciphertext into the next block's key material rather than the plaintext, possibly with an abbreviated key schedule. SKDH Here I want to focus on the key agreement protocol. Both systems use a similar approach which has never been formally presented or documented. For convenience I will call it SKDH, for Symmetric Key Diffie Hellman. SKDH has some properties of Diffie Hellman key exchange, but it uses simple addition operations rather than public key functions. It also has some properties of identity-based encryption, in that there is a master key center that issues the private keys to each device. However it is not secure against collusion by users who know their private keys, so would not be suitable for a true IBE system. DTCP has two key agreement protocols. There is a full protocol which is EC-DH (elliptic curve Diffie Hellman) and is mandatory for "copy never" content, ie. pay per view content. It also specifies a restricted protocol which is acceptable for "copy once" and "copy no more" content, that uses the SKDH technique described below. This will be much cheaper to implement for manufacturers and is probably used by typical recording devices. DHCP has just one key agreement protocol and it is of this new type as well. SKDH key agreement has not been published but it is presumed that it works as follows. There is a secret matrix which is known only to the agency that issues keys. Let us call this the Master Matrix, MM. The system is based on matrix algebra as follows: Pub1 * MM * Pub2 = shared key. Pub1 and Pub2 are vectors of 1's and 0's which are the "public keys" of the two devices, called "key selection vectors" or KSVs. Each device is issued such a vector, along with its private keys, which are defined as follows: Priv1 = Pub1 * MM Priv2 = MM * Pub2 Priv1 and Priv2 are vectors of numbers whose size depends on the values in MM. Details for the two known implementations are described below. By associativity, we have: Pub1 * MM * Pub2 = Priv1 * Pub2 = Pub1 * Priv1 = shared key. The two parties do a key exchange by giving each other their KSVs, the public Pub1 and Pub2 values. Each one then multiples the vector of 1's and 0's they received from the other side times their vector of Priv values. This amounts to simply adding the Priv values selected by the 1's received from the other side. Because of the relationship between the public and private values, this insures that both sides receive the same shared key. The analogy to Diffie Hellman which motivated the name SKDH should now be clear. Each side receives a public value from the other, combines it with its own private data, and creates a shared secret. In HDCP, the MM matrix is 40 by 40, and entries are 56 bits long. In DTCP, the MM matrix is 12 by 12, and entries are 64 bits long. The weakness of this system is that if the the private key vectors are published, they leak information about the MM matrix. In principle as few as 40 private/public key pairs could fully reveal MM in the case of HDCP, and as few as 12 in the case of DTCP. This makes the cryptographic scheme unsuitable for any widespread identity based encryption scheme; it will only work in a closed system like these, where manufacturers must take great pains to keep their private keys secret. Attacks on HDCP Several attacks have been published and unpublished on HDCP. The most famous is from Niels Ferguson, who has announced an attack but will not publish it for the reasons described at macfergus.com/niels/dmca/cia.html. According to Ferguson: "HDCP is fatally flawed. My results show that an experienced IT person can recover the HDCP master key in about 2 weeks using four computers and 50 HDCP displays. Once you know the master key, you can decrypt any movie, impersonate any HDCP device, and even create new HDCP devices that will work with the 'official' ones. This is really, really bad news for a security system. If this master key is ever published, HDCP will provide no protection whatsoever. The flaws in HDCP are not hard to find. As I like to say: 'I was just reading it and it broke.'" Keith Irwin has published four (actually five) attacks on HDCP at angelfire.com/realm/keithirwin/HDCPAttacks.html [090531_HDCP-Attacks-Irwin]. His last one is perhaps along the lines that Ferguson envisioned, and I will say more about it below. Similar concepts are presented in apache.dataloss.nl/~fred/www.nunce.org/hdcp/hdcp111901.htm by Scott Crosby, Ian Goldberg, Robert Johnson, Dawn Song and David Wagner [090531-hdcp_111901_linear-flaw]. This paper assumes (unlike Irwin) that attackers have access to the private keys of chosen devices. This is a questionable assumption as it will take very expensive laboratory equipment to extract sensitive key material from today's protected chips. Irwin's fifth attack is presented in an addendum. It involves presenting random KSVs to a display and using a birthday trick to find the "shared key" values relatively quickly, which could lead to a break in about a month. However Irwin is more pessimistic about the number of displays and assumes that 74 will be needed to have a good chance of spanning the whole matrix. If 50 properly chosen displays are enough then Irwin's attack would be pretty close to Ferguson's two week time frame. All of these attacks focus on finding the master secret MM value; once that is found, the security of the system collapses. Given a KSV it is immediately possible to deduce the corresponding private key if you know the MM. Although both HDCP and DTCP have mechanisms for revocations of cracked keys, a total break like this cannot be rescued by revocation. Attacks on DTCP DTCP seems not have gotten as much attention from cryptographers, in part because the details are secret. But its restricted authentication handshake uses the same SKDH algorithm as HDCP. DTCP requires the two sides to have certificates, but it appears that the receiver of the data does not check them, so Irwin's random-KSV birthday attack should still work. It may take a little longer due to the key size being 64 rather than 56 bits, but this will be somewhat compensated by the fact that the matrix size is 12 rather than 40. The time will depend crucially on how quickly a handshake can be completed with a device, and the DTCP spec is somewhat vague about this. It's possible that the handshake could be much faster, and then the attack could complete even more quickly than HDCP. Since DTCP has only a 12 bit public key there are only 2^12 possibilities, so these keys will not be distinct between different devices, but rather will be common across a model or even across a manufacturer. This could make it harder to find 12-15 devices with different keys that will span the MM matrix. The M6 cipher used in DTCP is actually a family of ciphers, and some of them are attacked in http://schneier.com/paper-mod3.html by John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier and David Wagner. However that attack depends crucially on the use of addition in a certain phase of the algorithm, and M6 is also documented to use XOR there in some variants. The specific version of M6 used in DTCP is not known, and even if the attackable version is used it's not clear if this would weaken the cipher enough to make it the weakest link in the chain. Summary Both HDCP and DTCP use cryptographic mechanisms for which published attacks have existed for several years, yet deployment proceeds unabated. Almost all new HDTV equipment in the U.S. implements one or both of these cryptographic protocols. As discussed above, if enough private keys leak or are scraped out, or if Irwin's attack works, the security of these systems will collapse. DTCP has a fallback in is its certificate protected, EC-DH based full authentication mode, using AES-128 to avoid any weaknesses in M6. It would take years though before existing equipment could be obsoleted by ceasing to support the restricted authentication mode that uses SKDH. HDCP has no fallback and it would be necessary to redesign the handshake, again with a several year lag time for deployment of the updated system. It will be interesting to see whether these theoretical attacks can be successfully mounted now that HDTV equipment is widely available. As the cost continues to drop over the next couple of years it should soon be practical for hobbyists to begin experimenting with Irwin's attack and start collecting KSV + private key pairs. DTCP would be an even more attractive target as it would allow easy computer recording of protected data via Firewire, USB2, or IP. However its reliance on the much-maligned principle of security through obscurity (keeping the details secret) may in practice give it a greater degree of protection.
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All your liberty are belong to the “peoples republic” ..
fios fireball and other joys
dslforum_enterprise_data
moca en2210
tr069
cwmp enabled(0)
ConnectionRequestURL
tr064
some fun links
No scripting knowledge required
requires:
Firefox (preferably version 2) ((MAC))
adblock plus with all three EasyLists
a free CoScripter account (ibm)
==
Since most facebook games are played at mouse addicted to pleasure button level the entire process can be automated with CoScripter. Login, start CoScripter for game, loop until happy while getting a can of Jolt. Cheating at facebook games has never been easier.
I share this with you to torment the ‘people’ at facebook, and to see how the arms race unfolds, but mostly for my S/E amusement.
There are other choices for running macros but this will be the most destructive productive
.
continues
No scripting knowledge required
requires:
Firefox (preferably version 2) ((MAC))
adblock plus with all three EasyLists
a free CoScripter account (ibm)
==
Since most myspace app “games” are played at mouse addicted to pleasure button level the entire process can be automated with CoScripter. Login, start CoScripter for game, loop until happy while getting a can of Jolt. Cheating at myspace games has never been easier.
I share this with you to torment the ‘people’ at myspace, and to see how the arms race unfolds, but mostly for my S/E amusement.
There are other choices for running macros but this will be the most destructive productive
.
continues
http://chinavasion.com/product_info.php/pName/broad-spectrum-cell-phone-jammer/
this won’t stop itards and the like from powering their trillion lux screen in a dark theater but with zero reception even the most cretinous will abandon the attempt sooner than usual
http://www.adobe.com/devnet/flashplayer/articles/fplayer9_security_03.html
DRM by any other name…
outlaws and catapults
whying starts here
https://www.adobe.com/cfusion/support/index.cfm?event=membership&loc=en_us
… with delightfully borked ssl
http://kb.adobe.com/selfservice/viewContent.do?externalId=tn_14266&sliceId=1
I sense a less restrictive streaming video widget on the horizon…. DRM is a great way to tank flash… VCR freedom will continue
Feast on Sagacious Sagacious Syndication Snippets
